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Taking Great Care: Defining Victims of Hate Speech 
Targeting Religious Minorities 
Whittney Barth  
Abstract 
This Comment explores the intersection of race and religion in cases brought before the 
Human Rights Committee alleging violations of Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. This article proposes a positive requirement for states parties to 
prohibit hate speech. Specifically, the following analysis considers Committee determinations of 
standing in cases brought by Muslims living in Europe who sought to challenge a state partys 
response to discriminatory remarks made by public figures. This Comment argues that these 
determinations, which appear to implicitly endorse a lower threshold for group standing when both 
race and religion are under attack (rather than religion alone) lead to three undesirable outcomes: 
1) they weaken promised protections for minorities; 2) they fail to acknowledge the internal racial
diversity of religious communities and the growing salience of religious identity; and 3) they do not
account for the range of ways in which religion, race, and ethnicity are coded in the content and
interpretation of the hate speech. In light of this analysis, this Comment argues for a more
consistent application of the Human Rights Committees own broad standard of admissibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Protecting individuals from discrimination on the basis of their race and 
religion has had a place on the U.N.s agenda since its inception. Often this 
principle collides with concerns over the appropriate limits of freedom of 
expression.1 There are clear limits when criminal activity is involvedvandalism 
of a temple or mosque cannot be adequately defended as expressive.2 Yet debate 
continues as to how far protection against animus should extend when it comes 
to verbal attacks. In some countries, like the U.S., hate speech is not criminal 
unless and until it is paired with criminal conduct.3 In others, only hate speech 
that rises to the level of incitement is unlawful.4 The U.N., while recognizing the 
importance of freedom of expression, supports the latter approach. 
This Comment focuses specifically on hate speech by public figures that 
targets people based on protected statuses, namely religion and race. While the 
statuses of race and religion are intertwined, their evolution and trajectory within 
the U.N. have been distinct. This Comment explores the manner in which each 
status has developed through cases brought before two human rights adjudicatory 
bodies and highlights a troubling result: in some instances, Muslims have been 
denied standing to challenge state responses to discriminatory remarks on the 
grounds that their claims amount to actio popularis, or claims brought solely in the 
interest of the public, as opposed to personal, welfare.5 However, their 
coreligionists challenging both religious and racial or ethnic discrimination have 
been granted standing. These different outcomes track the findings of scholars 
                                                 
1  The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human 
Rights require a prohibition on advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred from its members. 
See generally Elizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response to Hate Speech, 29 
STAN. J. INTL. L. 57 (1992). Professor Defeis points out that, [i]n contrast to the United States 
Constitution, international conventions specifically recognize that protected rights can be abused, 
often with the effect of denying others different rights. Id. at 58. Prior to the founding of the U.N., 
the rights of minorities not to be discriminated against was also recognized through a series of post-
World War I treaties promulgated by the League of Nations, although these protections were 
limited to minorities residing in specific states. DANIEL MOECKLI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WAR ON TERROR 61 (2009). 
2  Some scholars argue that hate crimes should not be separate or enhanced crimes. For a window 
into this debate within the United States, see generally Jeff Jacoby, Punish Crime, Not Thought Crime, in 
THE HATE DEBATE: SHOULD HATE BE PUNISHED AS A CRIME? 11422 (Paul Iganski ed., 2002).  
3  See Comparing Hate Speech Laws in the U.S. and Abroad, NATL PUB. RADIO (Mar. 3, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/54LX-PXPH. 
4  Id.  
5  See Actio Popularis, BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed., 2014). 
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who argue religious affiliation as a protected status is currently more tenuous in 
international law than other minority statuses.6 
This Comment argues that international adjudicatory bodies should apply 
the same amount of deference to group standing when petitioners claim inciteful 
hate speech has targeted them because they are a religious minority as when 
petitioners claim that hate speech has targeted them because they are both a 
religious and racial minority. The need for this is illustrated by the odd results of 
several U.N. Human Rights Committee decisions involving Muslims living in 
European countries.7 On at least two occasions, petitioners who brought a claim 
involving hate speech directed at Muslims were not granted an opportunity for 
their case to be heard on the merits. However, on another occasion, different 
petitioners who brought a claim involving hate speech that attacked them as 
members of a religious and racial minority were allowed to proceed with their 
case. The latter result aligns more closely with the outcome of similar cases heard 
by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, whose broad 
standard for determining victim standing was actually borrowed from the Human 
Rights Committee.  
These discrepancies are problematic for at least three reasons: 1) the 
determinations appear to curtail the comprehensiveness of promised protections 
against inciteful hate speech by public figures; 2) they seem to elide racial diversity 
within a religious community, potentially resulting in uneven protection within the 
same community even if hate speech is targeted broadly; and 3) they do not engage 
with the many ways race and religion may be intertwined in the speech of 
perpetrators and the perceptions of the broader public hearing the speech. The 
following analysis zeroes in on cases involving hate speech by a politician or other 
public figure, because hate speech by politicians is likely to pose a special threat 
to vulnerable groups as compared to private actors who engage in similar speech. 
Section II gives a brief history of the U.N.s current instruments addressing 
racial discrimination, religious discrimination, and freedom of expression. The 
Section considers the historical relationship between race and religion at the U.N. 
and then explains how they have remained separate but intertwined. The Section 
6
7
See Nazila Ghanea, Are Religious Minorities Really Minorities?, 1 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 57, 5960 
(2012) (Religious minorities have always been assumed to be part and parcel of the minorities 
regime normatively, but have, in fact, rarely been protected through it.); see also generally David 
Keane, Addressing the Aggravated Meeting Points of Race and Religion, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 367 (2006). 
Compare A.W.P. v. Denmark, Communication No. 1879/2009, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/109/D/1879/2009, ¶ 6.4 (Nov. 25, 2013), Andersen v. Denmark, Communication 
No. 1868/2009, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/99/D/1868/2009 (Sept. 14, 2010) with 
Mohamed Rabbae et al. v. Netherlands, Communication No. 2124/2011, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/117/D/2124/2011, ¶ 9.5 (Nov. 18, 2016).  
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introduces two key documentsthe International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)8 and the International Convention for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)9and briefly explores the tension 
between the right to freedom of speech and expression and the rights of 
individuals to be protected by the state from discriminatory speech. 
Section III outlines the legal mechanisms for challenging states parties 
responses to hate speech under the ICCPR and ICERD. The U.N. Human Rights 
Committee and the U.N. Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
the judicial bodies that administer ICCPR and ICERD respectively, have extended 
standing to members of groups targeted by the state party or not adequately 
protected by it.10 Three cases brought by Muslims living in Europe challenging 
state responses to discriminatory and hateful remarks made by public figures are 
examined in this section. 
Section IV examines, in light of these decisions, the relationship between 
hate speech claims brought on the basis of race and religion and those brought on 
the basis of religion alone. It further examines how determinations of who counts 
as a victim of hate speech may be similar to attempts to define religion for the 
purposes of international law. 
II. RACE, RELIGION, AND HATE SPEECH AT THE U.N.
The U.N. has grappled with the intersection of racial discrimination,
religious discrimination, and the right to free expression since its founding.11 
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the equal 
protection of rights without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.12 Article 7 entitles every person to protection from 
discrimination.13 Article 18 ensures the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, which includes the right to manifest religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance.14 
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR].  
9 International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 
660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD].  
10 See Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. 
Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Dec. 25, 1991) ee  discussion in Section III.A, infra. 
11 See Keane, supra note 6, at 36770. 
12 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1948
[hereinafter UDHR]. 
13 Id. at art. 7. 
14 Id. at art. 18. 
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At the same time, the right to freedom of opinion and expression is 
enshrined in Article 19.15 There has long been a debate about the appropriate 
limits of this freedom. Concerns over how to protect communities from hate 
speech that might incite violence while also protecting against fascism initially 
informed both sides of this debate in the aftermath of World War II.16 As 
discussed below,17 later iterations of the right to freedom of expression, at least in 
the legal instruments of the U.N., settled on coupling it with special 
responsibilities.18 A number of states party have made reservations to these 
particular portions of the instruments, however, which indicates that the matter is 
far from settled.19 
Race and religion are both enumerated as protected classes in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). However, status-based legal protections 
for race and for religion have not developed at the same pace or to the same 
extent. One scholar described international efforts to eliminate discrimination 
based on race and religion as parallel, unequal regimes.20 The development of a 
legal infrastructure to combat racial discrimination has proceeded in a way that is 
clear-sighted and tenacious, but similar efforts aimed at combating religious 
discrimination have proceeded in fits and starts.21 Before considering how race 
and religion play out in contemporary decisions of the Human Rights Committee, 
it is important to understand the different legal landscapes affecting race and 
religion. 
15 Id. at art. 19. 
16 See Defeis, supra note 1, at 97. 
17 See discussion in Sections II.AII.C, infra.  
18 See ICCPR, supra note 8, at Article 19.3. Articles 18 and 19 of the U.N. Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights provided the template for the same articles within the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, but the UDHR lacks both the ICCPRs special duties and 
responsibilities (Article 19.3) as well as its prohibition on incitement (Article 20) provisions. 
Compare UDHR, supra note 12, with ICCPR, supra note 8.  
19  At the time of this writing, 169 states parties have ratified the ICCPR; an additional 6 are signatories, 
and 22 have taken no action. At the time of this writing, 179 states parties have ratified ICERD, 4 
are signatories, and 14 have taken no action. For an interactive map of the status of the ICCPR, the 
ICERD, and related optional protocols, see Status of Ratification at U.N. Hum. Rts., Office of the 
High Commissioner, Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties, 
https://perma.cc/8BBH-JMSP.  
20  See Keane, supra note 6, at 367. 
21  Id. Note that Professor Keane does not claimnor does this authorthat the problem of racial 
discrimination has somehow been solved because of a stronger legal infrastructure; this is merely a 
commentary on the development of each as a regime within international law. The question of 
effectiveness is left for another day. 
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A. U.N. Protections against Racial  Discrimination  
The U.N. Declaration on Human Rights entitles every person to protection 
from discrimination, including on the basis of race.22 The U.N. General Assembly 
continued its effort to end racial discrimination with the adoption of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) in 1965.23 Article 1 of ICERD offers a broad definition 
of racial discrimination, including 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.24 
Article 8 of ICERD established an adjudicatory body, the Committee for the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, to hear complaints brought by individuals 
against member states alleged to be in noncompliance with the Convention. 
Today, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination continues to 
play a central role in international legal efforts to counter racial discrimination.25 
In addition to hearing claims from individuals, the Committee continues to 
publish extensive country-specific findings that are presented during its regular 
session meetings. These files include state party reports, input from civil society 
organizations, national human rights institutions, information from other 
stakeholders, and concluding observations.26 
Another landmark effort to combat discrimination on the basis of race was 
the 2001 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, 
and Related Intolerance in Durban, South Africa.27 Agenda items were grouped 
into five themes: 1) sources and contemporary manifestations of racism and racial 
discrimination and related intolerance; 2) victims; 3) measures of prevention, 
22 See UDHR, supra note 12, at Articles 2 and 7. For a brief adoption history, see 
https://perma.cc/86YC-DFYU.  
23 See generally ICERD, supra note 9.  
24 Id. at art 1.1. 
25 See José A. Lindgren Alves, Race and Religion in the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 941, 94752 (2008). For an in-depth look at the interworking of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, see id., at 947 et seq.  
26 See, for example, U.N. Hum. Rts., Office of the High Commissioner, CERDInternational 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Nov. 20, 2017Dec. 8, 
2017), https://perma.cc/B33F-7EZP. 
27 U.N. Commn on Hum. Rts., The World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (Aug. 31Sept. 8, 2001), https://perma.cc/H7VF-D67U 
[hereinafter World Conference Against Racism]. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights was 
replaced by the Human Rights Council in 2006 by action of the U.N. General Assembly.  
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education, and protection aimed at eradication; 4) provision of effective remedies, 
recourses, and redress; and 5) strategies to achieve full and effective equality.28 
B. U.N. Protections against Relig ious Discrimination  
When the U.N. General Assembly convened for a third time, a convention 
on the elimination of racial discrimination was proposed and included support for 
addressing manifestations of racial prejudice and religious intolerance.29 This 
was in 1962 and came as a response to a growing number of anti-Semitic incidents 
in several countries during the winter of 19591960.30 The General Assembly 
ultimately decided to split the issues of racial prejudice and religious intolerance 
and address them separately, resulting in two resolutions.31 Both called for draft 
declarations and conventions to be submitted to the General Assembly.32 
A Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief (DEAFIDBRB) was eventually 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1981 and offers the most in-depth discussion 
of religious discrimination of any U.N. document.33 However, it is not legally 
binding.34 Claims of religious discrimination may also be brought under Article 18 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a 
multinational treaty enforced by the Human Rights Committee and discussed at 
length in Section II. 
The U.N. established a Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance in 1986, 
a position renamed the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 
(SRFRB) in 2000.35 The SRFRB is primarily responsible for conducting fact-
28 Id.  
29 Keane, supra note 6, at 372. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 373. 
32 Id. 
33 G.A. Res. A/RES/36/55, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief (Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter DEAFIDBRB]; see also 
Hum. Rts. Council Res. A/HRC/RES/22/20, Freedom of Religion or Belief (Apr. 12, 2013); Hum. 
Rts. Council Res. A/HRC/RES/6/37, Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Dec. 14, 2007). For enactment and endorsement 
history of DEAFIDBRB, see U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Hum. Rts., Human Rights 
Documents, https://perma.cc/TX52-HH3Y (last visited May 20, 2018). 
34  See Lindgren Alves, supra note 25, at 945 (describing the DEAFIDBRB as having no more than 
recommendary force). 
35  The name change was endorsed by the U.N. Economic and Security Council in 2000 and by the 
General Assembly, G.A. Res. A/RES/55/97 (Dec. 4, 2000). See U.N. Hum. Rts., Office of the High 
Commissioner, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, https://perma.cc/GBZ9-
SLVC (last visited May 20, 2018). 
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finding missions to identify existing and emerging obstacles to the enjoyment of 
the right to freedom of religion or belief; for promoting the adoption of measures 
at national, regional and international levels; and for examining governmental 
actions that are incompatible with DEAFIDBRB. 
In March 2016, for instance, then-SRFRB Heiner Bielefeldt visited Denmark 
on a three-day fact-finding mission. This visit was a first by a SRFRB to a 
Scandinavian country.36 The SRFRB chose Denmark in part because of the 
countrys high-profile attempt to grapple with the perceived tension between the 
right to freedom of religion and the right to freedom of expression in the context 
of an increased presence of visible religious minorities due to immigration.37 While 
in Denmark, the SRFRB met with government authorities, civil society 
organizations, academics, and representatives of religious communities.38 Upon 
his return to Geneva, he issued a press release urging inter alia the Danish 
government to develop a more inclusive Danishness.39 
                                                 
36  U.N. Hum. Rts., Office of the High Commissioner, Preliminary Findings of Country Visit to 
Denmark by Heiner Bielefeldt Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief (Mar. 22, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/LPL4-GLKR.  
37  Id. The SRFRB noted in particular the 2006 cartoon crisis, the role of the established Church of 
Denmark in an increasingly diverse society, and the 2015 decision of the government (surprisingly 
at the request of left-leaning political parties) to keep the blasphemy provision as part of the 
countrys penal code. Id. Related issues are taken up in some of the Human Rights Committee cases, 
see Section III, infra. This Comment is limited in scope to cases involving hate speech toward 
religious minorities and therefore does not explore cases involving, for instance, blasphemy. For a 
critical look at all state practices of limiting insulting speech, see Amal Clooney & Philippa Webb, 
The Right to Insult in International Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 313 (2017). 
38  The role of the Special Rapporteur is similar to that of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination and the Human Rights Committee insofar as it involves the examination of state 
infringements on a fundamental right. However, the SRFRBs work is both limited in its 
enforcement power, since the role does not carry a binding judicial capacity, and more expansive in 
its constructive aims, insofar as DEAFIDBRB conceptualizes religion as not just as a fundamental 
right to be protected but a means to an end of fulfilling the goals of the U.N. Charter. See, for example, 
DEAFIDBRB, supra note 33 (Considering that it is essential to promote understanding, tolerance 
and respect in matters relating to freedom of religion and belief and to ensure that the use of religion 
or belief for ends inconsistent with the Charter of the U.N., other relevant instruments of the U.N. 
and the purposes and principles of the present Declaration is inadmissible . . . [c]onvinced that 
freedom of religion and belief should also contribute to the attainment of the goals of world peace, 
social justice and friendship among peoples and to the elimination of ideologies or practices of 
colonialism and racial discrimination). Further exploration of this aim is outside the scope of this 
Comment. It is worth noting, however, that the use of religion in this constructive way is a 
potentially problematic undertaking for an inter-governmental organization even as such an aim 
may, independently be embraced by individuals and like-minded civil society organizations.  
39  U.N. Hum. Rts. Office of the High Commissioner, Freedom of Religion: UN Expert Urges Denmark to 
Move Toward a More Inclusive Danishness (Mar. 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/XM4M-5BJN. 
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C. Grappling with Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech
Like freedom from discrimination based on race and religion, freedom of
expression is part of the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights. Article 19 ensures 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive[,] and impart information and 
ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.40 As with freedom of religion, 
there is no binding international treaty focused solely on the freedom of 
expression, but the U.N. did appoint a Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (SRPPRFOE) in 
1993.41 The original mandate was guided by the UNDHRs affirmation of the 
right to freedom of expression and mindful of its reiteration and limitation in 
the ICCPR.42 
Although the original mandate and subsequent renewals did not discuss hate 
speech, a 2002 report from the SRPPRFOE took up the issue. Writing in a 
post-9/11 context,43 the SRPPRFOE defended the ideal of an unabridged 
right to freedom of expression but acknowledged instances where this ideal 
conflicts with the rights of others, namely when the freedom of speech 
leads to incitement of hatred and/or discrimination.44 He concluded that, 
[i]n light of these concerns, the Special Rapporteur recognizes that hate
speech calls for reasonable restrictions which are necessary to prevent
incitement to acts of imminent violence, hatred or discrimination on grounds,
among others, of race, religion, colour, descent, or ethnic or national origin.
40  UDHR, supra note 12, at art. 19. 
41  Commn on Hum. Rts. Res. 1993/45, Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 11 (Mar. 5, 
1993). 
42  Id. at Preamble. The special mandate gives further evidence of the impetus of the Commission on 
Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council) for establishing the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (SRPPRFOE). The 
preamble notes the Committees deep concern over reports of detention, discrimination, threats, 
and violence facing individuals within the field of information (journalists, editors, authors, 
printers, etc.). Id. The SRPPRFOEs role was affirmed and extended in March 2008. Hum. Rts. 
Council Res. A/HRC/RES/7/36 (Mar. 28, 2008); see also Hum. Rts. Council Res. 
A/HRC/RES/16/4 (Mar. 24, 2011); Hum. Rts. Council Res. A/HRC/RES/25/2 (Mar. 27, 2014); 
Hum. Rts. Council Res. A/HRC/RES/34/18 (Mar. 24, 2017) (extending the mandate for three 
year periods).  
43  Writing four months after September 11, 2001, the SRPPPRFOEs report urged all Governments 
to refrain from targeting groups such as religious and ethnic minorities, political activists and the 
media and not to respond to terror by adopting laws which have a negative impact for the realization 
of human rights, in particular the right to freedom of opinion and expression as stated in article 19 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Economic and Social Council, Commn on Hum. 
Rts., Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of Expression, 
E/CN.4/2002/75, 56 (Jan. 30, 2002). 
44  Id. at ¶ 62. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
78 Vol. 19 No. 1 
As such, and in accordance with the relevant international standards, the 
Special Rapporteur wishes to condemn any advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes an incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence; such advocacy should be prohibited by law.45 
In doing so, the SRPPRFOE expressed concern that such laws would be used 
against those they were intended to protect, especially in situations where respect 
for human rights and the rule of law is weak.46 The SRPPRFOE called for 
great care to be exercised in balancing this ongoing tension.47 
The SRPPPRFOEs report encouraged states to ratify the International 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights,48 which contains two articles pertaining to 
freedom of expression. Article 19 includes the right to hold opinions without 
interference and the freedom to seek knowledge and impart information and 
ideas.49 Paragraph 3 of Article 19 notes that freedom of expression carries special 
duties and responsibilities50 and therefore may be subject to restrictions if 
necessary to respect the rights or reputations of others or for the protection 
of national security or of public order . . . or of public health or morals.51 Article 
20 prohibits advocacy of hatred that incites discrimination, hostility, or violence.52 
Similarly, Article 4 of ICERD prohibits the advocacy of racial superiority, 
which includes both the incitement of racial discrimination as well as the 
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred.53 States party also 
have the imperative to take positive steps, including enacting laws that punish the 
dissemination of such ideas and the violent acts or incitement they cause and the 
prohibition on public authorities or public institutions, national or local, [from] 
promot[ing] or incit[ing] such discrimination.54 
45 Id. at ¶ 64. 
46 Id. at ¶ 65. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 5 (Executive Summary). 
49 ICERD, supra note 9, at art. 19 ¶¶ 12.  
50 Amal Clooney and Phillipa Webb note that the drafting history of this portion of Article 19 indicates 
that most states understood that these could include limitations to prevent incitement to 
discrimination, hatred, and violence but since these were included in the Article 20, enumerating 
them in Article 19 would have been redundant. Clooney & Webb, supra note 37, at 16. 
51  ICERD, supra note 9, at art. 19 ¶ 3. 
52  For a more detailed discussion, see Section III , infra.  
53  ICERD, supra note 9, at art. 4. Recall that Article 20(2) of the ICCPR requires legal prohibitions on 
any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence. See also Clooney & Webb, supra note 37, at 18 and n. 76 (noting that the plain 
language of Article 18 suggests states parties are required to criminalize speech, a conclusion the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has recommended be reserved for serious 
cases).  
54  ICERD, supra note 9, at art. 4. 
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Later U.N. documents affirm ICERDs broad reach. For instance, the 
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA),55 adopted at the World 
Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance in 2001, calls on states as a matter of urgency to accede to 
ICERD, with the goal of universal ratification of ICERD by 2005.56 DDPA also 
builds on that broad mandate, going so far as to encourage 
political parties to take concrete steps to promote equality, solidarity and non-
discrimination in society, inter alia by developing voluntary codes of conduct 
that include internal disciplinary measures for violations therefore, so their 
members refrain from public statements and actions that encourage or incite 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.57 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination welcomed the 
DDPA and used it as an opportunity to further enumerate measures to be taken 
to strengthen its own work combating racial discrimination.58 
On the one hand, these articles can be seen as providing strong protection 
of minority rights.59 Article 20 is particularly important because it is the only 
instrument that provides minorities with generalized protection from hate speech, 
whether by state or by non-state actors.60 Dr. Nazila Ghanea61 argues that this 
                                                 
55  The World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related 
Intolerance, Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (Sept. 8, 2001), 
https://perma.cc/2MHS-5PBZ [hereinafter DDPA]; see also World Conference Against Racism, 
supra note 27.  
56  DDPA, , supra note 55, at Programme of Action ¶ 75.  
57  P.O.E.M. v. Denmark, Communication No. 22/2002, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/22/2002, ¶ 7 (Mar. 19, 2003); see also 
A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark, CERD, U.N. Doc. Communication No. 40/2007, 
CERD/C/71/D/37/2006 (Aug. 8, 2007); Andersen v. Demark, Communication No. 1868/2009, 
Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/99/D/1868/2009 (Sept. 14, 2010). 
58  See Rep. of the CERD, U.N. Doc A/57/18, at 10911 (2002).  
59  Ghanea understands minority rights to include the collective aspects of individual rights and 
possibly also . . . the protection of groups per se. Nazila Ghanea, Minorities and Hatred Protections 
and Implications, 17 INTL J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 423, 423 (2010) (emphasis in original); see 
also Robin Edger, Are Hate Speech Provisions Anti-Democratic?: An International Perspective, 26 AM. U. 
INTL. L. REV. 119, 127, 154 (2011) (noting the proper balance is not between free speech and 
offense but between free speech and equality). 
60  Ghanea, supra note 59, at 42526. She compares the broad sweep of this article, which includes 
national, racial or religious hate or discrimination with the narrower focus of ICERD (race, 
colour and ethnicity). It is clear that sometimes targeted characteristics overlap and some may 
prove more salient than others. For instance, Ghanea approves of the fact that linguistic 
minorities, although represented in the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, are not included in Article 20. The 
whipping up of linguistic hatred, alone rather than in conjunction with the other two grounds of 
race or religion, seemingly posed too remote a possibility for consideration. Id. at 426.  
61  Associate Professor in Human Rights Law, University of Oxford.  
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provision is not overly broad because it sets a threshold: only hate speech that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence is prohibited.62 
Ghanea acknowledges that the rationales in favor of limiting hate speech are 
controversial63 but sees the ICCPR as engaging in an adequate balancing of the 
speakers right to expression and the listeners right to have her inherent dignity 
protected from hate speech injuries.64 
On the other hand, scholars have expressed concern that the concept of 
special responsibilities unduly restricts the rights associated with free 
expression.65 Furthermore, broader concerns about the profound 
disagreements among states as to their responsibilities, manifested in the number 
of reservations to each treaty provision, have led some observers to conclude that 
the requirements of international human rights law for each state will be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, a troubling prospect for preventing an 
erosion of the freedom of expression.66 
Finally, the SRPPRFOE has suggested that politicians and other public 
figures have their own special responsibilities not to engage in hate speech.67 In a 
2012 report, he concluded that there has been a worrying increase in the number 
of expressions of hate, incitement to violence and discrimination, a concern 
because every individual human being is entitled to the same dignity and rights, 
including the right not to be discriminated against, regardless of national origin, 
social, racial, ethnic or religious background, disability, gender, sexuality or any 
62  Ghanea, supra note 59, at 428.  
63  Ghanea summarizes the three rationales identified and ultimately critiqued by D. Kretzmer. Those 
rationales are: 1) limiting the spread of racist ideas; 2) protect[ing] the feelings of victims and 
maintain[ing] public peace; and 3) highlight[ing] the symbolic importance of rejecting the 
indignity of living in a society in which such speech is tolerated. Id. at 43233. She agrees with 
Kretzmer insofar as he concludes that there is a sufficient enough relationship between racial 
prejudice and racial discrimination and violence to justify not disregarding it. Id.; see David 
Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 45556 (1987). 
64  Ghanea, supra note 59, at 432 (citing Scott J. Caitlin, A Proposal for Regulating Hate Speech in the 
United States: Balancing Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 69 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 771, 777 (1994)).  
65  Clooney & Webb, supra note 37, at 17. Clooney & Webb note that the drafting history of Article 20 
reveals that it was first proposed by a Soviet diplomat seeking to provide a powerful weapon . . . 
to restrict the dissemination of Nazi-Fascist propaganda. Id. (quoting U.N. Comm. on Hum. Rts. 
Drafting Comm., 2nd Sess., 28th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.28 (May 18, 1948)). It 
was adopted with fifty-two votes in favor, nineteen against, and twelve abstentions. Id. For a more 
in-depth discussion of the reservations, see generally Clooney & Webb, supra note 37. 
66  Id. at 21; see also Mark Osiel, Rights to Do Grave Wrong, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 107, 107 (2013) (arguing 
that some dangers ought to be mitigated by extra-judicial encumbrances on their irresponsible 
exercise rather than through laws).  
67  Clooney & Webb, supra note 37, at 2728. (collecting and recounting cases decided before the 
European Court of Human Rights that have taken both approaches). 
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other grounds.68 The SRPPRFOE also urged policymakers and politicians to 
condemn hate speech rather than remain silent as extremist groups attempt to 
hijack the freedom of expression debate and . . . cast themselves in the role of the 
ultimate defenders of free speech.69 When politicians are themselves the source 
of the hate speech, additional sanctions should be imposed according to article 
4(c) of ICERD, which could include removal from office, in addition to effective 
remedies for victims.70 
The cases explored in the next Section demonstrate both the balancing act 
lauded by Ghanea, and the discretionary challenges highlighted by Clooney and 
Webb. 
III. RACE, RELIGION, AND VICTIM STATUS: WHO
GETS STANDING? 
The Human Rights Committee and the Committee for the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination adopted a broad standard for determining who qualifies as 
a victim for the purposes of seeking relief.71 However, as the cases below 
demonstrate, the two bodies disagree as to the exact scope of that standard and, 
in the case of the Human Rights Committee, within the body itself from case to 
case. This creates uncertainty about who is recognized as harmed by hate speech. 
A. The Toonen Standard
The Human Rights Committee first articulated a broad standing requirement
in the 1993 case, Toonen v. Australia,72 in which the petitioner, an openly gay man 
and an activist for gay and lesbian rights, challenged laws in the state of Tasmania 
criminalizing private homosexual activity. While at the time of the case the laws 
had not been enforced in over a decade (and had never been enforced against 
Toonen personally), the petitioner argued that their presence fuel[ed] 
discrimination and harassment of, and violence against, the homosexual 
community of Tasmania,73 could lead to unlawful attacks on the honour and the 
68 G.A. Res. A/67/357, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, at 21 (Sept. 7, 2012). 
69 Id. at 19, ¶ 65. 
70 Id. at 23, ¶ 81. 
71 Toonen, supra note 10; Oslo Jewish Community v. Norway, Communication No. 30/2003, CERD, 
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003, ¶ 3.2 (2005). The standard, established by the Human Rights 
Committee, has also been adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, a body whose 
decisions are outside the scope of this Comment.  
72  Toonen, supra at note 10. Although this case did not involve hate speech or racial/religious 
discrimination, the standard CCPR adopted in Toonen has been applied in such cases. 
73  Id. at ¶ 2.7. 
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reputation of the individuals concerned74 and were a violation of the right to 
privacy under Article 17 of the ICCPR.75 In support of these claims, he submitted 
that figures of authority in Tasmania ha[d] made either derogatory or downright 
insulting remarks about homosexual men and women over the past few years.76 
Furthermore, Toonen claimed that a campaign of official and unofficial hatred 
made it difficult for advocacy groups to disseminate information in favor of 
decriminalization.77 He further argued that there were no effective state remedies, 
either legislative or administrative, because the Tasmanian Parliament remained 
deeply divided over the issue of decriminalization.78 
In determining whether Toonen qualified as a victim for the purposes of 
Article 1 of the Optional Protocol (the enabling document of the ICCPR),79 the 
Committee explained that he had made reasonable efforts to demonstrate the 
threat of enforcement and the pervasive impact of the continued existence of 
these provisions on administrative practices and public opinion had affected him 
and continued to affect him personally and that they could raise issues under 
articles 17 and 26 of the Covenant.80 
In subsequent opinions, the Committee emphasized that Toonen did not 
establish a standing requirement so broad as to encompass actio popularis claims; 81 
rather, a claim must demonstrate that a state party has by an act or omission 
already impaired the exercise of [the petitioners] right or that such impairment is 
imminent.82 Yet the Committee has also stated that it is a matter of degree how 
concretely this requirement should be taken.83 
                                                 
74  Id. at ¶ 3.1(a). Article 17 of the ICCPR prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, 
family, home or correspondence and unlawful attacks on honor and reputation. ICCPR, supra 
note 8, at art. 17.  
75  Toonen, supra at 10, ¶ 3.1. 
76  Id. at ¶ 2.5. 
77  Id. at ¶ 2.6. 
78  Id. at ¶ 3.3. 
79  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).  
80  Id. at ¶ 5.1. The Committee ultimately found a violation of Article 17 and found it unnecessary to 
address the question of an Article 26 violation. Id. at ¶ 11. It is also worth noting that in this case, 
unlike the others discussed later in this Comment, the state party largely agreed with the charges 
brought by the petitioner insofar as they related to specifically to Tasmania, noting that the rest of 
the country had already repealed such laws.  
81  Claims brought by a member of the public in the interest of the public welfare. Actio Popularis, 
supra note 5. 
82  A.W.P., supra note 7; Andersen, supra note 7, at ¶ 6.4.  
83  Mohamed Rabbae, supra note 7. 
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CERD first applied the Toonen standard in its 2003 decision Oslo Jewish 
Community v. Norway,84 a case challenging the general inability of Norwegian law 
to protect [petitioners] adequately against the dissemination of anti-Semitic and 
racist propaganda, and incitement to racial discrimination, hatred[,] and 
violence.85 The two petitioners, a leader of the Jewish communities in Oslo and 
Trondheim and a leader of the Norwegian Antiracist Centre, brought their claim 
after a leader of a Nazi organization was acquitted by the Norwegian Supreme 
Court of domestic criminal charges that prohibit the threatening, insulting, or 
subjecting to hatred, persecution or contempt, any person or group of persons 
because of their creed, race, color or national or ethnic origin.86 
The petitioners acknowledged that their argument was one of first 
impression before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
but argued that Toonen should be applied as it had been by the Human Rights 
Committee, namely to extend victim status to all members of a particular group, 
as the mere existence of a particular legal regime may directly affect the rights of 
the individual victims within the group.87 The Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination affirmed this view, finding the petitioners qualified as 
groups of individuals for the purposes of Article 14 of ICERD.88 
B. ICCPR and the Human Rights Committee  
The ICCPR, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966 and ratified in 
1976, recognizes the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family. 89 It also enumerates a number of rights, including 
the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race or religion and the 
right to freedom of expression so long as that expression does not amount to the 
incitement of hatred, violence, or discrimination. Article 20(2) declares that any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.90 
Furthermore, Articles 2 and 3 establish that a state party has certain 
responsibilities toward individuals within its jurisdiction. These obligations 
include ensuring that equal rights are upheld regardless of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
                                                 
84  Oslo Jewish Community, supra note 71. 
85  Id. at ¶ 3.2. 
86  Id. at ¶ 2.5.  
87  Id. at ¶ 3.2. 
88  Id. at ¶ 7.4. 
89  ICCPR, supra note 8, at Preamble. 
90  Id. at art. 20(1) (prohibiting war propaganda). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 84 Vol. 19 No. 1 
birth or other status.91 Article 2(3) requires a signatory to provide access to 
competent adjudicators when claims of violations are made, as well as to an 
effective remedy for anyone whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.92 Individuals who feel 
that a state party has not provided an effective remedy may bring a complaint 
before the Human Rights Committee.93 
The following cases were brought by individuals who claimed that a state 
party failed to sufficiently remedy discriminatory speech by a state actor who, at 
least in part, singled out the petitioner or the petitioners community on the basis 
of religion. These cases fall under Articles 20(2) and the enforcement articles (2 
and 3) of the ICCPR. The discussion here focuses on Article 20(2) cases.94 
                                                 
91  Id., at art. 2(2). 
92  Id. at art. 2(3). ICCPR contains an article for which there is no analog in ICERD. Article 4 grants 
states, in times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of 
which is officially proclaimed, to take measures derogating from their obligations under the present 
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not 
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 
Id. Several articles are exempt from this derogation clause, including Article 18, which protects the 
freedom of thought, conscience and relation, and of individuals to be freedom from coercion 
that would impair that freedom to have/adopt a religion or belief of choice, subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Id. at art. 18. Other articles exempted 
from Article 4 include Articles 6 (inherent right to life), 7 (right not to be tortured), 8 (paragraphs 
1 [prohibition on slavery] and 2 [prohibition on servitude]), 11 (no imprisonment for inability to 
fulfill a contract), 15 (right not to be convicted of a criminal offense if not an offense at time of 
commission), and 16 (right to be recognized everywhere as a person before the law). Id. at art. 4, 
¶ 2; see also id. at art. 19 (protecting the right to hold opinions without interference and the right 
to freedom of expression, which comes with special duties and responsibilities, which may lead 
to certain restrictions as are necessary for respect of the rights or reputations of others or for 
the protection of national security or of public order . . . or public health or morals). 
93  See U.N. Hum. Rts. Office of the High Commissioner, Jurisprudence, https://perma.cc/A33K-JBRG. 
The Human Rights Council has been a subsidiary organ of the U.N. General Assembly since 2006; 
its predecessor was the Commission on Human Rights, the body that created the Special 
Rapporteur on Religious Tolerance in 1986. Michael Weiner, Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion or BeliefInstitutional, Procedural and Substantive Legal Issues, 2 RELIGION & HUM. 
RTS. 3, 35 (2007). An individual may only bring a complaint against a state that is party to the First 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Office of the High Commissioner, Complaint 
Procedures, https://perma.cc/GV9K-JQVY.  
94  As discussed in Section II above, Article 18, in contrast to Article 20, guarantees the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and therefore the role of the state party differs in 
cases brought under one article than cases brought under the other. In Article 20(2) cases (often in 
conjunction with Article(s) 2 and/or 3), the states prosecutorial, judicial, or administrative decisions 
toward a third party are being challenged as inadequate. In article 18 cases, the state itself is accused 
of infringing upon an individuals right to freedom of religion. 
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1. A.W.P. v. Denmark 
In a 2009 case, A.W.P. v. Denmark,95 the petitioner relied upon the Toonen 
standard to argue that he should be considered a victim because he belonged to a 
group or class that might be adversely affected by remarks in a newspaper equating 
Muslims to Nazis.96 The derogatory remarks were made by members of the 
Danish Peoples Party in response to the news that a female parliamentary 
candidate planned to wear her hijab while addressing Parliament.97 
The DPP member stated: just like the Nazis believed that everyone from 
another race should be eliminated it is the belief in Islam that everyone of another 
faith must be converted if not eliminated.98 Two days later, another politician 
from the same party stated that Muslim societies are per definition losers. 
Muslims cannot think critically . . . and this produces losers.99 Yet another 
politician from the same party made further comments stating that the idea of a 
fundamentalist with headscarf [sic] becoming a member of Parliament was 
sick.100 
The petitioner, a Muslim man and Danish citizen, saw the comparison of 
Islam to Nazism as a personal insult that create[d] a hostile environment and 
amounted to concrete discrimination against him.101 The petitioners initial 
complaint to the Copenhagen Metropolitan Police did not result in the 
prosecution of the politicians for their remarks, a decision upheld on appeal to the  
Public Prosecutor General. The appellate authority determined that neither the 
[petitioner] nor his counsel could be considered legitimate complainants in this 
instance since they lacked a substantial, direct, personal and legal interest in the 
outcome of the case.102 Furthermore, the Public Prosecutor General noted that 
statements covered by section 266(b) of the Criminal Code are usually of such a 
general nature that there generally would be no individuals who are legitimate 
complainants.103 Section 266(b) reads: 
(1) Any person who, publicly or with the intention of wider dissemination, 
makes a statement or imparts other information by which a group of people 
                                                 
95  A.W.P. v. Denmark, supra note 7.  
96  See Oslo Jewish Community v. Norway, supra note 71; Case of Open Door and Dublin Well Women v. 
Ireland, 64/1991/316/387388, Eur. Ct. Hr. Rts. (Oct. 29, 1992). 
97  A.W.P. v. Denmark, supra note 7, at ¶ 2.1. 
98  Id.  
99  Id.  
100  Id. 
101  Id. at ¶ 2.2. 
102  A.W.P. v. Denmark, supra note 7, at ¶ 2.4. Requirements needed to qualify as an injured person 
according to the Act of on the Administration of Justice section 749(3). Id.  
103  Id.  
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are threatened, insulted or degraded on account of their race, colour, national 
or ethnic origin, religion, or sexual inclination shall be liable to a fine or to 
imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.104 
The fact that a statement is made in the nature of propaganda activities is 
considered an aggravating circumstance.105 
The state party challenged, inter alia, the petitioners claim that the remarks 
fell within the scope of Article 20(2), noting that the politicians remarks took 
place within the context of a public debate, were condemned by the majority of 
other members of Parliament and, although offensive, did not incite religious 
hatred.106 Furthermore, the state rejected the petitioners evidence in support of 
the alleged likelihood of an attack, which consisted of a 1999 study that showed 
racist attacks against people from Turkey, Lebanon, and Somalia living in 
Denmark. The state argued that such evidence was not deemed compelling as to 
why the petitioner, a native Dane, had any real reason to fear attacks or 
assaults.107 
The Human Rights Committee determined that the petitioner did not qualify 
as a victim with regard to Articles 20(2) and 27 of the ICCPR, because he failed 
to establish that those specific statements had specific consequences for him or 
that the specific consequences of the statements were imminent and would 
personally affect him.108 In its decision the Human Rights Committee reiterated 
that no one may challenge a law or practice by actio popularis.109 
In a concurring opinion, three Committee members argued, citing Toonen, 
that the HRC should dispose of the case based on the petitioners failure to 
substantiate his claims of violation of his rights, rather than because of a lack of 
victim status.110 
104  Id. (citing DANISH CRIMINAL CODE Sec. 266(b)). Denmark further argued that Section 266(b) was 
not intended to narrow political debate or curb the way in which topics are presented as it is 
especially important for elected representative to have freedom of expression. Id. at ¶ 4.10. The 
petitioner in this case challenged the states lack of investigation into whether the statements in 
question fell within section 266(b), ¶ 2 makes the use of propaganda for disseminating such 
messages an aggravating factor.  
105  Id. at ¶ 2.4 & n. 2.  
106  A.W.P. v. Denmark, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 4.54.6.  
107  Id. at ¶ 4.13.  
108  Id. at ¶ 6.4. See 
 
109  Id.  
110  A.W.P. v. Denmark (concurring opinion by Mr. Yuva Shany, Mr. Fabian Omar Savlvioli & Mr. 
Victor Manuel Rodríguez-Rescia), supra note 110, at ¶ 1.  
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2. Andersen v. Denmark
The facts and outcome of Andersen v. Denmark111 are similar to those of
A.W.P. v. Denmark. The petitioner, Fatima Andersen, brought a challenge to the 
Danish states decision not to prosecute members of the Danish Peoples Party 
for remarks that she argued form[ed] part of an overall ongoing campaign stirring 
up hatred against Danish Muslims.112 In this instance, the petitioner, a Danish-
born Muslim woman who wore a headscarf, challenged a particular statement 
made by Ms. Pia Kjærsgaard on National Danish Television that likened the hijab 
to the Nazi swastika.113 She too relied on the Toonen precedent to establish herself 
as a victim, since, as a member of a group singled out for attack, these statements 
not only hurt her but put her at risk of attacks by some Danes who believe that 
Muslims are responsible for crimes they have in fact not committed and inhibited 
her chances of finding employment.114 
As in A.W.P., the Committee determined that Andersens claim amounted 
to an actio popularis attempt and was therefore inadmissible. In this case, Andersen 
had failed to establish that the statement by Ms. Kjærsgaard had specific 
consequences for her or that the specific consequences of the statements were 
imminent and would personally affect her.115 
It is possible that the outcome of both A.W.P. and Andersen can be explained 
simply by weak facts: the speech in question just did not rise to the level of 
incitement.116 This explanation is unconvincing. To say the claims in A.W.P. and 
Andersen were facially weak elides a preliminary matter: Why did the decisions rely 
so heavily on the facts to determine standing when, as will be seen in the next 
case, petitioners who bring claims involving hate speech that targets both religious 
and racial minorities seem to be given the benefit of the doubt?117 
3. Mohamed Rabbae et al. v. Netherlands
In contrast to A.W.P. and Andersen, petitioners in Mohamed Rabbae v.
Netherlands118 were granted standing to bring their claim before the Human Rights 
Committee. Petitioners were Muslims and dual nationals of the Netherlands and 
Morocco and challenged the states decision to acquit a politician who had 
111  Andersen, supra note 7. 
112  Id. at ¶ 3.2. 
113  Id. at ¶ 2.1. 
114  Id. at ¶ 3.4. 
115  Id. at ¶ 6.4. 
116  TEMPERMAN, supra note 108, at 113. 
117  See Section IV B, infra, and accompanying notes. 
118  Mohamed Rabbae, supra note 7.  
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engaged in derogatory speech against both Muslims and migrants.119 The 
politician, Geert Wilders, was a member of Parliament and founder of the Party 
for Freedom, a right-wing political party in the Netherlands.120 Over a three-year 
span, the police received hundreds of reports expressing concern about Mr. 
Wilders insults and incitement to discrimination, violence and hatred.121 
The public prosecutor originally declined to prosecute, but was ultimately 
compelled to bring charges by an appellate court order.122 Mr. Wilders was charged 
with insulting a group for reasons of race or religion and incitement to hatred 
and discrimination on grounds of race or religion.123 The petitioners joined the 
proceedings as injured parties and argued that the statements fell within the 
definition of criminal incitement, aiming to clarify the limits of what can be said 
in political debate and to establish the practical meaning of their right to be 
protected from incitement to hatred, discrimination and violence.124 They argued 
that Mr. Wilders statements were not directed at Islam as a religion but against 
Muslims as human beings or against non-Western migrants, going beyond insults 
and amounting to incitement to hatred, discrimination, and violence.125 For 
instance, on one occasion Mr. Wilders stated: 
The demographic composition of the population is the biggest problem in 
the Netherlands. I am talking about what comes to the Netherlands and what 
multiplies here. If you look at the figures and its development. Muslims will 
move from the big cities to the countryside. We have to stop the tsunami of 
Islamization. That stabs us in the heart, in our identity, in our culture. If we 
do not defend ourselves, then all other items from my programme will prove 
to be worthless.126 
In other statements, he directly linked Islam, Moroccan young people, and 
violence and expressed support for commentators who said that a third Islamic 
119  Id. at ¶ 2.11. In A.W.P. v. Denmark and Andersen v. Denmark the race of the petitioners is not 
discussed; there is only reference to both being native-born Danes. See A.W.P., supra note 7, at 
¶¶ 1, 4.13. 
120  Mohamed Rabbae, supra note 7, at ¶ 2.1. 
121  Id.  
122  A number of victims exercised their right under domestic law and lodged complaints with the court 
of appeal against the prosecutors decision not to prosecute. Id. at ¶ 2.2. 
123  Id. at ¶ 2.2. The charges were brought pursuant to sections 137(c) and 137(d) of the Dutch Criminal 
Code. Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at ¶ 2.7; see also id. at ¶ 7.6 (noing that the domestic court had found that, while Mr. Wilders was 
on the edge of criminal activity with his comments about the need for the Dutch to defend 
themselves against the influx of Muslims to the country, he reined himself in when he said he was 
not against Muslims but against Islam, a distinction the petitioners argued did not alter the 
essence and effect of his utterances).  
126  Id. at ¶ 2.7. 
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invasion is underway.127 In the end, the domestic court acquitted Mr. Wilder and 
rejected the petitioners claims.128 
The petitioners in this case were Moroccan Muslims who felt that they were 
personally and directly affected by Mr. Wilders hate speech and claimed to have 
suffer[ed] its effects in their daily lives, either through personal attacks or threats 
and humiliation online.129 Petitioner Rabbae, a former refugee who came to the 
Netherlands in 1966 and served as a member of Parliament from 19942002, 
chaired a national organization of Moroccans living in the Netherlands and cited 
research data before the court on intolerance and racism and the position of 
Moroccans in Netherlands society.130 Petitioner A.B.S., the daughter of 
Moroccan immigrants, stated that during the election campaign she was verbally 
harassed by a young man on a bicycle who yelled: Wilders is right, piss off from 
here!131 The third petitioner, N.A., received aggressive and threatening emails, 
tweets and other hate messages, many of which tracked Mr. Wilders language, 
after speaking before the first composition of the domestic court regarding the 
impact of Mr. Wilderss language. She ultimately decided not to appear before the 
second composition of the court because of the backlash.132 All three claimed they 
were affected by the states decision not to convict Mr. Wilders for hate speech 
and by the signal given to the public that his conduct [was] not criminal, a signal 
that made them anxious about their future in the Netherlands.133 
Here, the Human Rights Committee rejected the state partys contention 
that the claims in question amounted to actio popularis. The Committee explained 
that the petitioners 
do not bring abstract clams as members of the general population of the State 
party. The authors are Muslims and Moroccan nationals, and allege that Mr. 
Wilders statements specifically target Muslims, Moroccans, non-Western 
immigrants and Islam. The authors are therefore members of the category of 
persons who were the specific focus of Mr. Wilders statements. . . . Mr. 
Wilders statements had specific consequences for them, including in creating 
discriminatory social attitudes against the group and against them as members 
of the group.134 
Although the Committee ultimately decided that there was no breach of the 
ICCPR on the merits, the fact that the petitioners were granted standing is 
interesting in light of the Committees decision in A.W.P. v. Denmark and Andersen 
                                                 
127  Id. at ¶ 2.7. 
128  Id. at ¶ 2.6.  
129  Id. at ¶ 2.11. 
130  Id. at ¶ 2.1. 
131  Id. at ¶ 2.9. 
132  Id. at ¶ 2.10. 
133  Id. at ¶ 2.11. 
134  Id. at ¶ 9.6.  
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v. Denmark. The Human Rights Committee does not require that Article 20(2)
claimsor claims pursuant to any article of the Covenantallege multiple forms
of discrimination. However, the Committees decisions about who counts as a
victim for the purposes of initial standing determinations raise the issue.
The following cases before the Committee on the Elimination of Race 
Discrimination bear a striking resemblance to Mohamed Rabbae and offer a useful 
comparison of how each body analyzes standing. 
C. ICERD and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the 
adjudicatory body charged with overseeing the implementation of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD),135 has addressed similar issues.136 ICERD does not list 
religion as a separate protected element,137 although it is not surprising that several 
Article 4 cases involve discrimination based on religion as well as race.138 At the 
same time, Lindgren Alves notes that the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial 
135  As of October 2017, there were 178 states party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination. U.N. Hum. Rts., Office of the High Commissioner, Statement by Ms. 
Anastasia Crickley, Chairperson of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination at 
the 72nd session of the General Assembly (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/LF4N-FJ5W. As of 
July 2017, only 57 of the 177 member states have made an optional declaration recognizing the 
Committees competence to receive communications under article 14 of the Convention. U.N. 
Hum. Rts., Office of the High Commissioner, Opening Address by Adam Abdelmoula, Director 
Human Rights Committee and Treaty Mechanisms Division, at the 93rd session of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (July 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/K5BF-MQ8K. 
136  Recall that Article 4 prohibits both advocacy that may incite racial discrimination and the 
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred. ICERD, supra note 9, at art. 4.  
137  Lindgren Alves, supra note 25, at 942. However, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination does review the status of religious discrimination as presented in country reports 
submitted to the committee. Id. at 950.  
138  Other cases brought alleging a violation of Article 4 involve remarks against a Roma minority. See, 
for example, Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma et al. v. Germany, Communication No. 038/2006, 
CERD, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/72/D/38/2006 (Mar. 3, 2008) (dismissing complaint brought against 
vice-chairman of the German Detective Police Officers because opinion article expressing anti-
Roma views was written in his private capacity and he had been disciplined); Durmic v. State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro, Communication No. 29/2003, CERD, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/68/D/29/2003 (Feb. 20Mar. 10, 2006) (finding violation of Article 4 because state 
failed to question the thoroughness of the investigation into alleged discrimination of a man of 
Roma descent). Cases involving other minorities have also been brought before the CERD, 
including T.B.B v. Germany, Communication No. 48/2010, CERD, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/82/D/48/2010 (2013) (finding a violation of Article 2 because Germany failed to 
investigate whether a finance ministers derogatory statements about people of Turkish origin 
amounted to dissemination of ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred).  
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not as an aim in itself . . . but mostly as a means of countering the repression of 
ethnic minorities.139 
As discussed above, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination adopted the Toonen standard in a 2003 case, Oslo Jewish Community 
v. Norway. The Committees usage of the Toonen standard in Oslo Jewish Community
has been broader than its counterpart, the Human Rights Committee.140 One
explanation for this difference is that the ICERD, unlike the ICCPR, includes a
prohibition on the dissemination of ideas (setting a lower threshold for
victimhood than incitement), and therefore the new standard may not
dramatically alter a petitioners chances of being considered a victim under the
ICERD as it appears to have done in ICCPR cases. It is, however, instructive to
explore a few of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discriminations
decisions to see how race and religion continue to be intertwined and protected
together.
In a pre-Oslo Jewish Community case, Quereshi v. Denmark,141 a Danish national 
and member of the Danish Parliament brought a claim against the state party for 
its rejection of his complaints against members of the Executive Board of the 
Progressive Party who made anti-Muslim statements, including statements that 
encouraged people to engage in a civil war against Muslims in Denmark.142 
Similar statements were also made during the partys convention, an event 
required by law to be broadcast on public television.143 Criminal complaints were 
lodged against each of the speakers and the speakers were convicted. In Quereshi 
II,144 the Committee took note of these convictions and determined that the 
petitioner had not been deprived of his right to an effective remedy with respect 
to a general statement about foreigners, made by the one politician who was not 
convicted. The Committee found that the statement did not amount to an act of 
racial discrimination.145 
139  Lindgren Alves, supra note 25, at 946. Lindgren Alves also notes that the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has been able to adapt to new circumstances in no small 
part because of the flexibility allowed by its rules of procedure. Id. at 948. 
140  See TEMPERMAN, supra note 108. 
141  Quereshi v. Denmark, Communication No. 27/2002, CERD, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/63/D/27/2002 (Oct. 23, 2002). 
142  These included a party press release that decried the rape of Danish women by the 
Mohammedans, who ought to behave like the guests they are in this country and if not, then 
the politicians in the parliament [sic] have to change course and expel them all. Id. at ¶ 2.1. 
143  Id. at ¶ 2.2. 
144  Id. at ¶ 7.2. 
145  Id. at ¶ 7.3. 
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In Gelle v. Denmark,146 a Danish citizen of Somali origin challenged an 
appellate decision not to prosecute Pia Kjærsgaard, a politician with the Danish 
Peoples Party, for likening a colleagues decision to engage with the Somali 
community on potential legislation banning female genital mutilation to 
consulting with pedophiles about a law aimed at protecting children from 
molestation.147 Her remarks were published in an op-ed in a national newspaper. 
Like A.W.P., Gelle brought a claim under Section 266(b) of the Danish Criminal 
Code.148 On appeal, the regional public prosecutor noted that the legislators 
comments did not compare all Somalis to pedophiles; the legislator may have used 
an offensive example as a comparison, but this was made within the context of a 
current political debate. 
On the question of whether the challenge had been sufficiently substantiated 
by the petitioner, the Committee determined that Kjærsgaards statements were 
offensive enough to clear the initial hurdle of whether they fell within the scope 
of Articles 2.1(d), 4, and 6.149 The Committee determined that the comparison to 
pedophiles and rapists could be understood as degrading or insulting to an entire 
group of people150 because of their national or ethnic origin rather than their 
views on a particular topic and recalled General Recommendation No. 30, which 
calls on state parties to take resolute action to counter any tendency to target, 
stigmatize, stereotype or profile, on the basis of race, colour, descent, and national 
or ethnic origin, members of non-citizen population groups, especially by 
politicians.151 
In a related case, Adan v. Denmark,152 a Danish citizen of Somali descent 
sought criminal charges against a legislator who had not only expressed support 
for Pia Kjærsgaards statements, but further claimed that the practice of female 
genital mutilation was endorsed by all Somalis.153 The petitioner was an activist 
who worked to counter the practice of female genital mutilation within the Danish 
146  Gelle v. Denmark, Communication No. 34/2004, CERD, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/68/D/34/2004 
(Mar. 6, 2006). 
147  Id. at ¶ 2.2. This is the same member of Parliament whose remarks were the impetus for the ICCPR 
challenge in Andersen v. Denmark, see discussion in Part II(A)(2), supra. 
148  See id. at ¶ 2.2 & n. 1; see also Section III , supra. 
149  Id. at ¶ 6.2. 
150  Gelle, supra note 146, at ¶ 7.4. 
151  Id. at ¶ 7.5 (citing Rep. of CERD on its Sixty-Fourth Session, General Recommendation 30: 
Discrimination against non-citizens, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3, ¶ 12 (Feb. 23Mar. 
12, 2004)). The legislation was enacted in March 2004 and it added a new provision of section 81 
of the Criminal Code.  
152  Adan v. Denmark, Communication No. 43/2008, CERD, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/77/D/43/2008 
(Sept. 21, 2010). 
153  Id. at ¶ 2.2. 
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Somali community and argued that she had a personal interest in the outcome of 
the case as a member of a particular group likely to be affected by the legal 
regime.154 The petitioner explained that, as someone who is black Somali and 
Muslim, she was a double target of the Danish Peoples Party.155 The Committee 
found Ms. Adans claims admissible and went on to find that the state party had 
violated Article 2 by failing to carry out an effective investigation into the incident 
to determine whether an act of racial discrimination had taken place.156 
In Adan, Gelle, and Quereshi, the Committee largely accepted the petitioners 
status as a victim without much discussion. Even in instances like Quereshi, where 
no breach of the Convention was found, the preliminary question of standing was 
passively answered in the affirmative.157 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.N. decided long ago to protect religious and racial discrimination 
through different and distinct human rights instruments.158 Yet, in the hate speech 
context, it is clear that the intersection of race and religion remains salient. The 
development of ICERD jurisprudence demonstrates an appreciation for the ways 
in which discriminatory speech often reaches beyond the targeting of race to 
include religious identity, too. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination recognizes petitioners like Ms. Adan who are doubly targeted. 
The Human Rights Committee also appears to easily recognize petitioners, like 
Mr. Rabbae et al., who allege that a state party failed to protect them and others 
from hate speech targeting race and religion. At the same time, the Committee 
appears skeptical of claims from petitioners like Ms. Andersen who challenge a 
state partys response to hate speech that targets a religious community. 
This different treatment raises questions about how religion and religious 
membership are defined by adjudicatory bodies. It also highlights some of the 
recurring challenges in enforcing hate speech criminalization generally, namely 
deciding what content and context elevates speech to incitement. Nevertheless, 
154  Id. at ¶ 3.4. 
155  Id. at ¶ 5.6. 
156  Id. at ¶ 7.7. A note on terms: I am using the same broad definition of racial discrimination in this 
analysis as is used in ICERD. See discussion in Section II A, supra.  
157  But see Jama v. Denmark, Communication No. 41/2008, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/75/D/41/2008 
(Aug. 21, 2009) (determining the Committee did not have authority to issue judgement in case 
involving a complaint brought by a Danish national of Somali origin challenging the determination 
that the statements of politician who claimed during a media interview that Somalis were 
responsible for a physical attack did not fall within the scope of section 266(b) of the Criminal Code 
prohibiting racist propaganda).  
158  Recall the broad interpretation the U.N. General Assembly adopted in ICERD, which includes 
ethnicity and national origin in the definition of racial discrimination. See Section II(a), supra.  
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the current framework of the U.N., including the Human Rights Committee, 
offers religious minorities protection from hate speech that has the potential to 
incite violence. If this protection is to be effective, the Human Rights Committees 
admissibility decisions cannot screen out tough cases as a means of avoiding 
analysis of the impact of such speech on all members of religious minority 
communities. 
A. Defining Victims of Hate Speech:  Who Counts?
It is important to appreciate the intersectionality of identities and the unique
and often compounding experience of being a double target of hate speech.159 
In this regard it is encouraging to see adjudicatory bodies like the Human Rights 
Committee acknowledging these connections.160  
At the same time, it is important to be aware of implicitly or explicitly 
conflating a particular religion with a racial or ethnic group because this can 
diminish the impact of hate speech protections. First, this conflation minimizes 
the pool of potential petitioners based on whether or not they identify as members 
of both a religious and a racial or ethnic minority. Second, and relatedly, the 
conflation of a particular religion with a racial or ethnic group may limit the range 
of hate speech content that is perceived as rising to the level of incitement. 
José Lindgren Alves, a Brazilian diplomat and former member of the U.N. 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
notes that racism and religious prejudice, while commonly interlinked, are in 
essence different phenomena.161 Alves claim that past civil rights 
violations were mostly based on physical features justifies the development of 
stronger U.N. protections for racial minorities.162 It is also clear that the U.N. 
remains concerned about protecting religious minorities. This is evidenced by the 
work of the SRFRB inter alia and the Committee on the Elimination of  
159  See Adan v. Denmark, supra note 152, at ¶ 5.6. For a discussion of intersectionality, see EMILY
GRABHAM ET AL., INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND: LAW POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF
LOCATION 1 (Emily Grabham et al. eds., 2009). 
160  This is perhaps even more true for the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination as 
it continues to broaden its reach to include ethnic and religious discrimination. Stephanie E. Berry 
argues that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination should continue this trend 
and that Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim majority countries should be brought more fully 
into its fold. See Stephanie E. Berry, Bringing Muslim Minorities within the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial DiscriminationSquare Peg in a Round Hole?, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
423 (2011). She recognizes this move places outside the fold native-born converts and young 
Muslims who may wish to acknowledge their Muslim identity but not foreground ethnic or national 
ties. Id. at 441. This author finds these reasons, coupled with the concerns raised in Section IV(A) 
of this Comment, sufficient not to pursue such a strategy. 
161  Lindgren Alves, supra note 25, at 942. 
162  See Section II, supra.  
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evolving recognition that the intersection 
between racial and religious discrimination [is] a fact.163 
The Human Rights Committees decisions on Article 20(2) claims brought 
by Muslims in Europe raise questions about the weight the Committee gives to 
such claims when the content facially includes religious discrimination alone. In 
cases involving hate speech directed at Muslims generally, the Human Rights 
Committee twice denied standing on the basis of religion alone164 while affording 
standing to petitioners with compound religious and racial discrimination 
claims.165 
Not granting standing in cases of hate speech on the basis of religious 
identity alone fails to appreciate both the way in which religious and racial identity 
may be intertwined within religious communities and the way in which an 
individual may foreground one aspect of her identity over another. It is true, for 
instance, that the majority of Muslims living in Western Europe are either 
immigrants or from an immigrant background.166 However, immigration and 
conversion can lead to religious communities that are increasingly heterogenous. 
Certain identity markers may also take on different valences depending on a 
persons generation. For instance, in at least some European contexts, researchers 
have found that young Muslims are identifying as Muslim rather than with a 
particular cultural or ethnic group as they seek to develop a more European 
identity.167 
Furthermore, religious and racial discrimination implicitly, even if not 
explicitly, may be linked in the content of the hate speech, both from the 
perspective of the victim and from the perspective of broader society. For 
instance, in a survey of Muslims living in Europe, focus group participants in four 
large cities were asked about their states immigration policies. The consensus was 
that their religion was a major reason for discrimination and exclusion, because 
it clearly marked them as other against the backdrop of a Christian majority.168 
Indeed, this perception tracks what researchers have found in Germany and in 
163  Lindgren Alves, supra note 25, at 942.  
164  A.W.P. v. Denmark, supra note 7, at ¶ 6.4; Andersen, supra note 7, at ¶ 6.4. 
165  Mohamed Rabbae, supra note 7, at ¶ 9.6 (finding petitioners were members of the category of persons 
who were the specific focus of Mr. Wilders statements, namely Muslims, Moroccans, and non-
Western immigrants.).  
166  Jocelyne Cesari, Securitization of Islam in Europe, in MUSLIMS IN THE WEST AFTER 9/11: RELIGION,
POLITICS, AND LAW 9, 1011 (Jocelyne Cesari ed., 2010). 
167  Yasemin Shooman & Riem Spielhaus, The Concept of the Muslim Enemy in the Public Discourse, in 
MUSLIMS IN THE WEST AFTER 9/11: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND LAW 198, 198 (Jocelyne Cesari ed., 
2010).  
168  Cesari, supra note 166, at 12. 
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Turkey where religion is replacing ethnicity and immigration status within public 
debate.169 
Professor Spencer Dews recent commentary on the meaning of the label 
Muslim in Danish society tracks this sentiment. The term is a catch-all for non-
white immigrants, refugees, and others considered alien to Danish culture.170 In 
partial response to the recent tweets of an American celebrity declaring, inter alia, 
ISLAM is not a RACE, lefties,171 Dew notes that the Danish example is a 
textbook case for how race is more complicated than that.172 
If a petitioner is Muslim but cannot or does not claim status as a racial 
minority, the Toonen standard, properly applied, is still broad enough to recognize 
that individual has standing to bring an ICCPR Article 20(2) claim. The denial of 
standing in the Andersen case is a good example of the odd result if the standard is 
applied otherwise. While Ms. Andersens race is not made explicitshe is 
described only as a native-born Daneshe is visibly identifiable as Muslim 
because of her headscarf.173 Further, to the extent that a religious identity is 
racialized within broader society, there is some evidence from Great Britain to 
suggests that white Muslim converts are not completely immune from this process 
of racialization, despite their skin color.174 The Toonen net should at least be wide 
enough to protect all members of religious minority communities who may be 
targeted on the grounds of religion. This approach does not minimize the complex 
relationship between religious and racial identity or negate the fact that religious 
and racial minorities are often doubly targeted.  
Determining what amounts to hate speech that rises to the level of 
incitement for the purposes of Article 20(2) remains challenging.175 The 
169  Shooman & Spielhaus, supra note 167, at 198 ([R]eligion is equated with the national majority and 
keeps the religious minority outside the national imagination, no matter how well integrated or 
assimilated the mebers of the minority are.) (quoting Esra Ozyurek, Convert Alert: German Muslims 
and Turkish Christians as Threats to Security in the New Europe, in 51 COMP. STUD. SOC. & HIST. 91, 109 
(2000)). 
170  Spencer Dew, Something Rotten in the State of Denmark, SIGHTINGS, THE MARTIN MARTY CENTER FOR
THE PUB. UNDERSTANDING OF REL., UNIV. OF CHI. DIV. SCH. (June 14, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/8X2Q-KNX4. Professor Dew is a visiting assistant professor of religion at 
Denison University.  
171  Id. (quoting Roseanne Barr (@therealroseanne) , TWITTER, https://perma.cc/YJ4W-VRU5
 
172  Id.  
173  See Andersen, supra note 7, at ¶ 1; see also supra note 119. 
174  See Leon Moosavi, The Racialization of Muslim Converts in Britain and Their Experiences of Islamophobia, 
41 J. CRIT. SOC. 41 (2014). Moosavi conducted 37 in-depth interviews with white Muslim converts 
in Greater Manchester and explored how they, once identified as Muslim by non-Muslims, 
undergo a process he calls re-racialization within society. Id. at 43.  
175  See generally Section II C, supra.  
Religious Minorities and Defining Victims of Hate Speech Barth 
Summer 2018 97 
argument here is not that all claims alleging inadequate protection by the state 
from hate speech by public figures should automatically succeed on the merits.176 
What is crucial is consistency. It is important for the Human Rights Committee 
to be consistent in its consideration of standing. Furthermore, consistent 
application of the broader standard endorsed by the Human Rights Committee is 
appropriate not only for the sake of recognizing the internal diversity of religious 
communities but also because there are limited avenues for redress available for 
claims calling for adequate protection against hate speech on the basis of religious 
discrimination. 
B. Defining Victims of Hate Speech:  Who Decides?
The Human Rights Committees decisions not to grant standing to Muslim
petitioners in A.W.P. and Andersen, despite the broad Toonen standard, also raise 
questions about how adjudicatory bodies view religious group membership. To 
be clear, none of these decisions have challenged a petitioners claim of belonging 
to a Muslim community. However, the Human Rights Committees unfavorable 
admissibility decisions implicitly, if not explicitly, have the effect of signaling who 
is and who is not personally affected by hate speech within the same religious 
community. This judicial parsing raises similar concerns to those raised by judicial 
attempts to define religion.177 
Legal efforts to define religion often end up establishing rules for regulating 
social and legal relationships among people who may have sharply different 
attitudes about what religion is and what manifestations of it are entitled to 
protection.178 Legal definitions of religion therefore may contain serious 
deficiencies when they (perhaps unintentionally) incorporate particular social and 
cultural attitudes towards (preferred) religions, or when they fail to account for 
social and cultural attitudes against (disfavored) religions.179 To counter this 
176  See A.W.P. (concurring opinion by Mr. Yuval Shany, Mr. Fabian Omar Savlvioli, & Mr. 
Victor Manuel Rodríguez-Rescia), supra note 7, at ¶ 2. 
177  These concerns are not for the judiciary alone; they are also raised by legislative or 
executive/administrative attempts to define religion. 
178  T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of Religion in International Law, 16 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 189, 195 (2003). T. Jeremy Gunn is an associate professor of international studies at 
Al Akhawayn University in Morocco, a senior fellow at the Center for the Study of Law and Religion 
at Emory Law School, and a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europes 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of 
Religion. 
179  Id. Although Article 18 is not the focus of the Comment, a brief look at some of the cases that have 
come before the Human Rights Committee illustrate Gunns point. See, for example, Arenz et al. v. 
Germany, Communication No. 1138/2002, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/80/D/1138/2002 (Apr. 29, 2004) (finding claims against the state by members of the 
Church of Scientology who were ousted from a political party because of their beliefs were 
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tendency within themselves, Professor T. Jeremy Gunn suggests that judges 
should consider religion from the perspective of its adversaries, namely those 
who are doing the discriminating and persecuting to see what definitions are 
being employed to further the discrimination.180 
Recall that in Mohamed Rabbae, the Human Rights Committee did not state it 
was relying on direct evidence of injury when deciding the petitioners were in fact 
victims. The Committee, noting the fact that the petitioners were members of 
targeted group(s), namely Muslims as well as Moroccans and immigrants, 
concluded that their claims were not being brought actio popularis.181 This stands in 
direct contrast to the Committees determination in A.W.P. and Andersen. What is 
striking about this distinction is that actio popularis refers to a member of the 
general public.182 Here the Committee does not explicitly consider in its opinion 
A.W.P.s or Fatima Andersens membership within the Muslim communitythe 
community targeted by the remarks in both cases. Thus, Gunns question can be 
tweaked for the purposes of this Comment to ask not what counts as religion 
but rather who counts as a member of a religious community affected by hate 
speech. 
The cases discussed above present a range of remarks flagged as inciteful 
hate speech, some of which targeted Muslims generally, while others focused on 
Muslims and racial and ethnic minorities. By denying initial victim status, the 
decisions of the Human Rights Committee appear to reify, even if 
                                                 
inadmissible on the grounds that it was not shown the courts acted arbitrarily); Goyet v. France, 
Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1746/2008 (Oct. 30, 2008) (rejecting a challenge 
to states inclusion of Soka Gokkai, a Buddhist organization, on its list of cults, citing no injury 
could be shown by petitioner); Ch.H.O. v. Canada, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/118/D/2195/2012 (Dec. 21, 2016) (upholding states decision to deport a Korean 
national who, because he identifies as a Jehovahs Witness, refused conscription and was seeking 
asylum out of fear of reprisal). But see Sister Immaculate Joseph and 80 Teaching Sisters of the Holy 
Cross of the Third Order of Saint Francis in Menzingen of Sri Lanka v. Sri Lanka, Hum. Rts. 
Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1249/2004 (Oct. 17Nov. 3, 2005) (finding a successful 
challenge to states practice of preventing the incorporation of Christian organizations engaged in 
charity and teaching).  
180  See Gunn, supra note 178, at 197. Gunn suggests abandoning scholarly definitions of religion 
altogether because they generally lack this perspective. See id. The author appreciates the complexity 
of the task but is wary of such a drastic move, especially given the continual evolution of scholarly 
definitions and thinking about religion.  
181  Mohamed Rabbae, supra note 7, at ¶ 9.6. The petitioners allege that Mr. Wilders statements 
specifically target Muslims, Moroccans, non-Western immigrants and Islam. The authors are 
therefore members of the category of persons who were the specific focus of Mr. Wilders 
statements. . . . Mr. Wilders statements had specific consequences for them, including in creating 
discriminatory social attitudes against the group and against them as members of the group. See 
text accompanying notes 13035, supra.  
182  Mohamed Rabbae, supra note 7,  at ¶ 9.6.  
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unintentionally,183 racialized notions of religious identity. This undermines or 
ignores the recommendations of the SRFRB that urge the Human Rights 
Committee to recognize the connection between race and religion, but not 
conflate them.184 
C. Free Speech and Equality: Considerations for Protection
As noted in Section II, the question of whether international law ought to
criminalize hate speech is a lively one. Some critics of hate speech criminalization 
point to the use of such laws to attack journalists and others in the information 
business.185 Others see the current regime under the ICCPR as striking a proper 
balance by requiring states to prohibit hate speech insofar as it incites to 
discrimination, hostility or violence.186 Others might see these cases as inviting 
further reflection on whether law is the proper channel for regulating hate 
speech.187 
The different outcomes at the admissibility stage highlight one of the 
concerns of critics who see penalizing hate speech as risky line-drawing. It is, after 
all, not easy to pin down what constitutes incitement, especially preemptively.188 
This imprecise standard necessarily depends on the surrounding societal context. 
Even focusing, as this Comment does, on remarks made by politicians and public 
figures, can lead to different outcomes. The SRPPRFOE takes the position that 
hateful remarks made by public figures reach a wider audience and thus may have 
more of an impact.189 Other courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, 
have ruled both waysarguing at times that politicians contribute to public 
discussion and therefore should be granted wider latitude, and at other times that 
politicians have special responsibilities because their words are more likely to 
incite.190 
Furthermore, these different standing outcomes for petitioners from the 
same religious community highlight fissures between how the Human Rights 
183  Recall that in A.W.P. and Andersen the race of the petitioners is not discussed; the opinions state 
only that they are both native born Danes and their claims are distinguished from those in Mohamed 
Rabbae and Oslo Jewish Community insofar as the latter allege the state failed to intervene in instances 
of both religious and racial hatred.  
184  Lindgren Alves, supra note 25, at 974 (citing CERD, 71st Sess. 1826th mtg. at 8, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/SR. 1826 (Aug. 9, 2007)). 
185  See text accompanying notes 4047, supra.  
186  ICCPR, supra note 8, at art. 20(2). 
187  See, for example, G.A. Res. A/67/357, supra note 68, at 17.  
188  See generally Clooney & Webb, supra note 37. 
189  See G.A. Res. A/67/357, supra note 68, and accompanying text. 
190  See Clooney & Webb, supra note 67, at 2728. 
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Committee conceives of protection of minority rights and the broad mandate of 
the ICCPR. For instance, one scholar analyzing hate crime protections in Canada 
notes that the debate is usually framed as between free speech and offense, but 
argues that the proper balance to consider is free speech and equality.191 The 
proper consideration, then, is whether everyones individual interest [is being] 
treated equally.192 This re-framing is helpful and captures the intentions behind 
the development of ICCPR and the U.N.s stance on minority rights. 
While the free speech and equality framing may not satisfy those critical 
of the potential scope of hate speech criminalization, this framing is useful for 
holding the Human Rights Committee to its own standard when it comes to hate 
speech cases involving religious minorities. This is, again, not to say that every 
Article 20(2) case should be decided in favor of the petitioners. It is, however, a 
call for consistency in initial determinations of standing. 
V. CONCLUSION
At the time of this writing, the tension enshrined in Article 19 (the right to 
freedom of expression) and Article 20 (obligation of states to prevent hate speech 
that incites discrimination or violence) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights shows no sign of resolution or irrelevancy. Internal diversity within 
religious communities and evolving notions of membership in these groups are 
also a reality and will likely continue to challenge social and legal notions of who 
counts. The ICCPR cases discussed in this Comment offer a glimpse into the 
complexity of victim experiences and the breadth of the vitriol aimed at minority 
communities. 
This Comment examines several standing determinations by the Human 
Rights Committee in claims by Muslim petitioners alleging inadequate state 
response to inciteful hate speech by public figures. This Comment argues that 
irregular application of the Toonen standard truncates the scope of potential 
protections for religious minorities under ICCPRs Article 20(2). It provides an 
examination of these cases in light of the historical development of the U.N.s 
human rights instruments holding states parties accountable for protecting 
religious and racial minorities from discrimination. The SRPPPRFOE193 urged for 
great care to be taken when striking a balance between the right to freedom of 
expression and the need to address speech that rises to the level of incitement to 
hatred and discrimination.194 For adjudicatory bodies, like the Human Rights 
191  Edger, supra note 59, at 12728.  
192  Id.  
193  Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
194  See E/CN.4/2002/75, supra note 43, at ¶ 62. 
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Committee, great care must also be taken to ensure consistent recourse for 
members of religious minority communities whose claims challenge inciteful hate 
speech by public figures. 
